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In eight hours, and on a Sunday, Murrow and Shirer
lined up newsmen to make reports, found the needed shortwave
facilities and went on the air -- live. The broadcast, a great
success, soon became a standard feature. Shortly thereafter, Shirer
recorded in his diary: "The [Austrian] crisis has done one thing
for us. Birth of the 'radio foreign correspondent' so to speak."
The basic forms were set early. Correspondents
would write their stories, clear them through censorship, then go to a
government-operated shortwave facility to transmit them live back to
CBS in New York. The programs sounded more organized than they were.
In New York, announcer Robert Trout might say, "We take you now
to William Shirer in Berlin." In Berlin, Shirer could not hear
Trout's voice; rather, he simply started speaking live into a
microphone at an assigned time.
The seizure of Austria was bad news; worse news
followed. The Western democracies deserted Czechoslovakia at Munich.
Murrow had a world scoop on the settlement, but took little
consolation in it. He was not so much a newsman as a citizen of the
world. The rise of Hitler was, to him, less a story to be covered than
an unraveling catastrophe he could do little to stem. Post-Munich,
Murrow met up with Shirer in Paris, where the pair tried without
success to drink themselves into a better frame of mind.
America seemed largely indifferent. To Murrow, it
was as though the greatest drama in history was playing to an empty
and deserted theater. In July 1939, Shirer was briefly back in New
York. His wife, Tess, told him he was "making [him]self most
unpopular by taking such a pessimistic view [of Europe]. They know
there will be no war." And Americans clearly wanted none. At
year's end, more than 95 percent of Americans polled were against war
with Germany. By then Poland had fallen. In April 1940, Denmark and
Norway followed. In May, German tanks rolled into the Netherlands,
Belgium and France, with resistance quickly subdued. On June 22, the
French surrendered at Compiègne, an event for which Shirer again
gained a world scoop. With the French surrender, England stood alone.
England's future was never more in doubt than in
the summer and fall of 1940 when Hitler, master of the Continent,
unleashed his Luftwaffe on Great Britain, his sole opponent
still standing. For Murrow, nothing less than the future of
civilization was at stake in that battle. For millions in America,
news of that conflict came each evening in a report that began with
Murrow's signature phrase, "This...is London."
England's south coast awaited invasion. In Berlin
two Nazi officials placed bets with Shirer: The first wagered that the
German swastika would be flying over Trafalgar Square by August 15;
the second said by September 7. Along the French and Belgian coasts,
the Germans concentrated the small craft -- 1,700 by mid-August --
with which they planned to transport the initial invasion wave of
90,000 soldiers and 650 tanks. In London a newspaper vendor posted a
placard that typified English resolve: "We're in the final. And
it's on the home pitch."
The German attack had two phases. In the first --
lasting from mid-August to early September 1940 -- the Luftwaffe
sought to destroy the Royal Air Force. If the RAF was defeated, it
could not provide air cover for the British navy, which would then be
forced to withdraw from the English Channel. A German crossing would
follow. In Germany, invasion planning proceeded. On September 2,
Shirer noted that German press officers had removed a gigantic
illuminated map of France that had been used to help reporters track
the invasion of that country. "That map has been taken
down," Shirer reported, "and an equally large one
substituted. It was a map of England."
From opposite sides of the Channel, Murrow in
London -- assisted by his colleague, Larry LeSueur, another of
Murrow's young hires -- and Shirer in Berlin tracked the first battle
in history to be fought solely in the air. Or at least they tried. All
acknowledged that with aircraft so small flying so high, it was all
but impossible to tell what was happening. Though many current
military historians believe the Luftwaffe was gaining an edge,
Hitler was impatient; he wanted the invasion to be accomplished by
late September, before the October fogs cut visibility in the Channel.
He decided that bombing civilian London would quickly cow the British.
On September 7, wave after wave of German bombers
struck London in a 12-hour attack. Murrow was southeast of the city,
trying to get a bead on the action. He interviewed Englishmen in a
variety of places, including spending part of the day near an RAF air
base. After writing his script, the following day he broadcast live
from the studio: "On the airdrome ground crews swarmed over those
British fighters, fitting ammunition belts and pouring in gasoline. As
soon as one fighter was ready, it took to the air, and there was no
waiting for flight leaders or formation. The Germans were already
coming back, down the river, heading for France." He spoke of
"the hollow grunt of the bombs, [the] huge pear-shaped bursts of
flame." He talked to a pub owner who "told us these raids
were bad for the chickens, the dogs and the horses." And for a
time, he simply took cover, hunkering down with Vincent Sheean, an
American writer whom Murrow pressed into service from time to time,
and Ben Robertson of the short-lived New York newspaper PM. As
Murrow described it: "Vincent Sheean lay on one side of me and
cursed in five languages....Ben Robertson...lay on the other side and
kept saying in that slow South Carolina drawl, 'London is burning,
London is burning.'" London, indeed, was burning. Four hundred
were dead, triple that many injured, and fires blazed throughout the
city.
London's stand against the bombing became the focus
of world attention; eventually, 120 reporters -- a huge number at the
time -- came to the British capital to report it. Murrow stood out as
unmatched. This was so, first, because of the manner in which he
portrayed the English -- not as heroes but as human: unflappable,
dogged, quirky. He reported how life among the many citizens continued
after the bombing of residential London began: "Walking down the
street a few minutes ago, shrapnel stuttered and stammered on the
rooftops and from underground came the sound of singing, and the song
was 'My Blue Heaven.'"
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He reported on Londoners' solidarity in the
shelters, but noted that even there, the rich fared better than the
working classes. He spoke of a cluster of "old dowagers and
retired colonels" who took refuge at the Mayfair Hotel. There, he
remarked, the protection was not great, but "you would at least
be bombed with the right sort of people." He reported on casual
courage. He described an official adding a name to a list of
firefighters killed battling fires the bombing had caused. The list,
Murrow noted, contained 100 names.
Added to Murrow's empathy for the British people
was his mastery of language. He was, his colleague Sevareid said,
"the first great literary artist of a new medium." Murrow,
through reflection and intuition, had a keen appreciation of
broadcasting's power and nature. Radio, he said, was essentially
intimate. It was not an announcer speaking to an audience, but Murrow
as an individual speaking to fellow individuals who had gathered by
their Philcos in living rooms in Kansas or New Hampshire. He believed
that radio was visual, and he had a gift for the evocative phrase.
When Winston Churchill was made prime minister, Murrow introduced him
as "Britain's tired old man of the sea." Knowing that
moonlight made London more visible to attacking aircraft, he referred
to one night sky as being brightened by "a bomber's moon."
And Murrow believed that radio's task was not to bring the story to
the listener, but to bring the listener to the story.
On August 24, two weeks before the "On the
airdrome" program, he had made a remarkable nighttime broadcast
from London's Trafalgar Square, standing just outside the entrance to
a bomb shelter. Live and unscripted, his words painted the scene: the
searchlights splashing white on the bottom of clouds; a red
double-decker bus -- most of its lights extinguished in the blackout
-- passing like a ship at night; a driver calmly stopping for a red
light on a totally deserted street. Murrow said he could see almost
nothing in the blackout. But he could hear something. Bringing his
listeners to the scene, he lowered the microphone to street level so
that people in America could hear the footsteps of Londoners taking
shelter from bombs.
Through it all, Murrow was battling on a second
front. That August 24 coverage of the bombing had raised questions
about the propriety of such live, on-the-scene reporting of the
attacks. As bombing continued, Murrow pressed British officials hard
for permission to do regular, unscripted, live, on-the-street
broadcasts of the events. Initially, British officialdom was
dismissive -- Murrow was not even a citizen, and live broadcasts could
give valuable information to an enemy that would presumably be
listening in. Murrow pressed the matter, explaining that his
broadcasts would be transmitted from his microphone through the BBC
headquarters, where they would still be subject to censorship. More
important, he gained an ally, Prime Minister Churchill. Forty years
earlier Churchill had been a correspondent in the Boer War, and he had
a newsman's residual compassion for getting the story out. More to the
point, he believed that anything done to dramatize London's struggle
would build American sympathy for England's cause.
By mid-September, Murrow gained permission. With
the live broadcasts, he became the star of his own drama, standing
exposed on rooftops. The sounds of bombs exploding near him were
clearly audible. In narrow terms, the work was quite remarkably
dangerous. In broader terms, his accounts of a city under siege made
compelling listening. Murrow's reports from London helped make radio
America's dominant news media. In one 1940 survey, 65 percent of
respondents said radio was their best source of news. His own audience
grew to 22 million, reportedly including President Franklin Roosevelt
and members of his cabinet. Many were swayed by what they heard.
During September 1940, the bombing's first month, the share of
Americans telling Gallup pollsters that their nation should aid
Britain increased from 16 to 52 percent. That month, President
Roosevelt went to Congress to repeal the Neutrality Act that barred
military support to the British.
Hitler had good reason to believe that the bombing
of civilian London would soon break Britain's will to resist. Prewar,
most military experts held that aerial bombardment would quickly
devastate any city. In 1932 British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin had
famously stated, "The bomber will always get through" -- a
remark that did little to bolster British self-assurance. As events in
London and elsewhere were to prove, such bombing more generally
strengthened than broke resolve. The London Blitz was, however, the
first sustained bombing of a major city. And when, contrary to
expectations, that city did not fall, respect for its stand grew.
Murrow shared the sentiment, and he broadcast that admiration. From
one bombed location, he reported: "The girls in light, cheap
dresses were strolling along the streets. There was no bravado, no
loud voices, only a quiet acceptance of the situation. To me those
people were incredibly brave and calm."
London sent its children to the countryside, ate
powdered eggs rather than fresh ones and endured the nightly attacks,
sleeping in bomb shelters. At year's end, Londoners were underfed,
under-rested and under bombardment. Murrow's December 29 broadcast
caught the grimness of the hour: "No one expects the New Year to
be happy. We shall live hard before it is ended. The immediate
problems are many and varied: Something must be done about the night
bombers and the submarines; improved facilities for life underground
must be provided." He added: "Probably the best summary --
written by Wordsworth [when England was at war with Napoleon] in 1806:
'Another year, another blow, another mighty empire, overthrown, and we
are left, and shall be left, alone, the last that dared to struggle
with the foe.'"
The bombing affected people strangely, noted
Sevareid, who joined Murrow in London after the fall of France. Those
who were walking when the first bombs dropped would halt. Those who
were standing would begin to walk. Murrow once awakened CBS
correspondent LeSueur, who was bunking at the Murrow's, with the news
that the building was on fire. LeSueur picked up his clothes and
walked into a closet to get dressed.
Murrow refused to go into shelters, saying that
once you did you lost your nerve. With considerable nonchalance,
Murrow, LeSueur and a young New York Times reporter, James
Reston, played golf on a nine-hole course on London's Hampstead Heath.
If a ball rolled near an unexploded bomb, it was declared an
unplayable lie.
The hazards were all too real. Out walking one
evening, Murrow suddenly stepped into a doorway. Two colleagues
instantly followed suit. Seconds later, a shell casing landed where
they had been standing. CBS was repeatedly bombed out of its tiny
London office -- always without serious casualty. Another evening, Ed
and Janet Murrow were walking home and he suggested stopping in the
Devonshire Arms, a pub frequented by journalists. Janet said she was
tired, so they continued home. Ten minutes later the pub received a
direct hit -- and everyone inside was killed.
Sevareid did not share that bravado. He lived a few
blocks from the BBC, and wrote: "To get to the underground
broadcasting facility meant a walk of a couple blocks for me. I would
shuffle cautiously through the inky blackness to each curbing where
the guns would make the crossing street a tunnel of sudden, blinding
light. [Then,] I would plaster myself against the nearest wall, and,
however sternly I lectured myself, I not infrequently found myself
doing the last 50 yards at a dead run."
If Murrow was not frightened, he was nonetheless
exhausted. Sleeping little, eating less and smoking four packs of
cigarettes a day, he was driven by his sense of the importance of the
event. Among other problems, Murrow had to reconcile his own views
with CBS' strict policy of nonpartisanship. In part he did this simply
by presenting the British as the underdog, relying on his countrymen's
natural sympathies to take England's side. Further, however, he was
inclined to attribute his own point of view to others, then report it
as news. He spoke of the attitudes of unnamed Englishmen who, he said,
had given up on the notion that victory could be achieved without
American aid. Now, Murrow reported, such Englishman had come to admit:
"British victory, if not British survival, will be made possible
only by American action. There are too many Germans, and they have too
many factories. It seems strange to hear English, who were saying,
'we'll win this one without America,' admitting now that this world --
or what's left of it -- will be largely run either from Berlin or from
Washington."
Of Murrow's influence, Sevareid later wrote:
"The generality of British people will probably never know what
Murrow did for them in those days....Murrow was not trying to 'sell'
the British cause to America; he was trying to explain the universal
human cause of men who were showing a noble face to the world. In so
doing he made the British and their behavior human and thus compelling
to his countrymen at home."
The German air assaults varied in intensity. The
strength of the attacks depended in part on the demands made by German
operations elsewhere and, apparently, by Germany's periodic shortage
of lubricating fluids for its aircraft. After a lull, the Luftwaffe
returned in April 1941. Murrow reported: "They came over shortly
after blackout time, and a veritable show of flares and incendiaries.
One of those nights where you wear your best clothes, because you're
never sure that when you come home you'll have anything other than the
clothes you were wearing." Given the size of the city, Murrow
added, it was difficult to judge the severity of an attack from one's
own vantage. If the bombs fall close to you, he added: "You are
inclined to think the bombing is very severe. Tonight, having been
thrown against the wall by blasts -- which feels like nothing so much
as being hit with a feather-covered board -- and having lost our third
office, which looks like some crazy giant had been operating an
eggbeater in its interior, I naturally conclude that the bombing has
been heavy." Actually, it was the heaviest single attack of the
war. The following month, CBS lost its fourth office.
Toward the end of 1941, Murrow returned to New York
to receive what one observer called the greatest welcome given a
journalist since Henry Morton Stanley returned, having found David
Livingstone. One thousand gathered for a testimonial dinner at New
York's Waldorf Astoria. There, poet and Librarian of Congress
Archibald MacLeish praised Murrow's work: "But it was not in
London really that you spoke. It was in the back kitchens and the
front living rooms and the moving automobiles and the hotdog
stands...that your voice was truly speaking." What Murrow had
done, MacLeish added, was to destroy the belief that what happened
3,000 miles away was not really happening. "You burned the city
of London in our houses and we felt the flames that burned it. You
laid the dead of London at our doors and we knew the dead were our
dead -- were all men's dead....Without rhetoric, without dramatics,
without more emotion than needed be, you destroyed the superstition of
distance and of time."
Murrow's own remarks were those of a man making a
case. He told the audience: "If you were in London now, you would
be surprised at the number of people who would say to you, 'Tell your
fellow countrymen not to make the same mistakes we made. We didn't
want anything of this world except to be let alone -- until it was
almost too late.'" And, again making reference to
"thoughtful Englishmen," Murrow used the podium to issue a
challenge: "The question most often asked by thoughtful
Englishmen is this: 'If America comes in, will she stay in? Does she
have any appetite for the greatness that is being thrust upon
her?'"
On the night that dinner was held -- December 2,
1941 -- America's role in the conflict was still unsettled. Five days
later, in an act that astonished Murrow, Pearl Harbor was bombed, and
America was at war.
With the United States at war, Americans leaned
more strongly into the day's events. CBS expanded its European news
team. In time, those reporting with Murrow included many who would
make great careers in broadcasting: along with Shirer, LeSueur and
Sevareid were Charles Collingwood, Howard K. Smith, Richard C.
Hottelet, Cecil Brown, William Downs and Winston Burdett. When Murrow
hired them, they were little more than kids -- bright boys in their
mid-20s -- as inexperienced at radio news reporting as Murrow had
been. They did, however, meet Murrow's personal standard: They could
think and they could write. And most modeled their approach to
gathering the news on Murrow's approach. Customarily, their reports
would be part fact, part essay, part color and part editorial, all
wrapped up in a crisply written two- or three-minute account that
became the standard format for CBS journalism. Many others in the
field regarded their work as the best ever done in broadcasting.
Murrow, who defined their task and directed their
efforts, never made any great claims for himself -- not for his
efforts during the Blitz, or for what followed. Writing to Charles
Collingwood in the immediate postwar period, Edward R. Murrow said,
"For a few brief years a few men attempted to do an honest job of
reporting under difficult and sometimes hazardous conditions and they
did not altogether fail."
This article was written by Mark Bernstein and
originally published in the June 2005 issue of American History
Magazine.
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